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Introduction 
The project of integrating newly-arrived immigrant groups into a host society is a multi-faceted 
one that takes place in both time and space. Immigrants groups and their descendants interface, 
among other things, with a country’s economy, education system, citizenship laws, housing, and 
health care.1 This paper focuses on the foundation of the political party Denk, and what the arrival 
of this immigrant-focused party might mean for the success or failure of the political integration 
of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, and descendants of immigrants, in The Netherlands.  
Political integration is not typically viewed as easy to categorize in one single quantitative 
metric. In the introduction to their book, Civic hopes and political realities: immigrants, 
community organizations, and political engagement, Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad lay out a 
potentially helpful differentiation between “political presence” and “political weight.”2 Political 
presence, broadly speaking, refers to the extent to which immigrant populations have the option to 
participate in the political system and, as a result, to be represented. Political weight, on the other 
hand aims to understand the relative power of immigrant groups within their political system and 
what opportunities they possess to make their voices heard.  
Hochschild and Mellenkopf broadly outline the trajectory for immigrant populations’ 
engagement with a new political system. First, immigrant groups step into their new political stage. 
Entry onto the political stage is necessarily the next step after the arrival of immigrant populations 
into their new country. This step includes “the articulation of interests or views” and involves, at 
least to an extent, recognition by those already in the political system.3 Second, immigrant groups 
become personally involved in the political arena: they act “as representatives, advocates, litigants, 
activists, or protestors.”4 Finally, a two-way interaction occurs where the political system responds 
(or doesn’t) to the new activity and the immigrants, in turn, again respond to it. Their “interests 
are met and values accommodated; the actors change the political process and are changed by it.”5 
It is important to note that the integration process can fail at any of these points, and in part this 
paper seeks to identify where in the process, if at all, such a failure is taking place with the 
foundation of Denk.  
The question that this paper seeks to answer is how do Dutch newspapers De Volkskrant 
and De Telegraaf portray two immigrant origin politicians who left the traditional labor party and 
founded their own immigrants-rights party, Tunahun Kuzu and Selçuk Öztürk? Understanding the 
 
1 Alba, Richard and Foner, Nancy. 2015. Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Immigrant 
Integration in North America and Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
2 Ramakrishnan, Karthick, and Irene Bloemraad. 2008. “Introduction,” in S. K. Ramakrishnan and I. Bloemraad 
(eds.), Civic Hopes and Political Realities: Immigrants, Community Organizations and Political Engagement. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation 
3 Hochschild, Jennifer, and John Mollenkopf. 2009. “Modeling Immigrant Political Incorporation,” in Jennifer 
Hochschild and John Mollenkopf (eds.), Bringing Outsiders In: Transatlantic Perspectives on Immigrant Political 
Incorporation. Ithaca, NY:  Cornell University Press, 15. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
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ways in which the two politicians and their immigrant-focused movement are portrayed is 
important because it shows how societies respond when immigrants and descendants of 
immigrants politicize issues relevant to them by asserting themselves within the political system. 
Is this viewed as a positive development, or are the politicians themselves blamed for not working 




What does success look like in the context of political integration? Irene Bloemraad writes that 
success in integration might look like what has happened over time with women’s participation in 
politics. From this point of view, as immigrants become more integrated into society, there is less 
of an inclination to participate in identity politics as voters’ interests fan out across the political 
spectrum.6 
Immigrants in the Dutch Political System 
Alba and Foner evaluate several different western European systems. The Dutch system, in their 
eyes, presents immigrants with some distinct benefits as well as challenges. “A double edged 
sword,” the Netherlands is incredibly representative in its parliament, as only approximately 
70,000 votes are necessary in any election to gain a seat.7 Furthermore, the preferential party-list 
system that exists enables any candidates of immigrant origin to gain support from their respective 
communities, even if they are placed relatively low on the party’s list by the overwhelmingly 
white, male party bosses. Those same bosses do retain a lot of power, however, and potential 
candidates are reliant on their approval to gain a spot on the list at all.  
 As tensions over immigration and multiculturalism have risen in the Netherlands in past 
years, according to Michon and Vermeulen those same party bosses who might grant those with 
immigrant background access to party lists have become more reticent in order to minimize 
backlash against the party.8 As a result, especially those of Turkish descent have found their 
political presence decreased as it has become more difficult to access power. As both politicians 
under study in this paper are ethnic Turks, one hypothesis will look at the importance newspapers 
place on that background, and what it might mean for their new party.  
Understanding Political Presence in the Netherlands 
As discussed previously, ‘political presence’ in a new host society is centered on access to politics. 
Access to the vote is crucial, and Alba and Foner also discuss this issue in their work. The 
Netherlands is relatively progressive in this respect, as only five years of established residency is 
required to vote in local and municipal elections. This is unlike many other countries, including 
the United States, which require citizenship to vote in any election at all.9  
Citizenship is required to vote in national elections, and it can be gained after five years as 
well. Those born in the Netherlands are entitled to conditional jus soli citizenship upon reaching 
adulthood.10 
 
6 Bloemraad, Irene. 2013. “Accessing the Corridors of Power: Puzzles and Pathways to Understanding Minority 
Representation” West European Politics 36(3): 652-670. 
7 Alba, Richard and Foner, Nancy. 2015. Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Immigrant 
Integration in North America and Western Europe. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
8 Michon, Laure and Vermeulen, Floris. 2013 “Explaining Different Trajectories in 
Immigrant Political Integration: Moroccans and Turks in Amsterdam,” West European Politics, 36:3, 
597-614, 
9 Alba, Richard and Foner, Nancy. 2015. Strangers No More. 
10 Ibid. 
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In terms of representation immigrant populations have fared rather well in Netherlands, 
especially when compared to other Western European countries. The numbers can be deceptive. 
In 2006, immigrants and those of immigrant descent filled only approximately 3 per cent of all 
town council seats in the Netherlands.11 In the four major cities of Rotterdam, the Hague, 
Amsterdam, and Utrecht, however, the same demographic numbers 20.6 per cent.12 When 
compared to the share of the total populations that immigrants represent, 8.9%, it is clear that 
immigrant political weight is centered on urban regions. What might such a relatively high 
presence of immigrant-background politicians in Dutch politics mean as newspapers analyze the 
foundation of Denk? A potential discursive angle the broadsheets might take is one which 
compares Kuzu and Özturk to other immigrants in the system that have not decided to form their 
own party. 
 
Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands 
Michon and Vermeulen investigated the differing presence of Moroccans and Turks in 
elected legislative city councils and in appointed executive positions. They found that, 
overwhelmingly, Turks were more likely to be elected to representative positions because of their 
stronger ethnic group ties. Moroccans, on the other hand, are less likely to be elected to office 
because they have pursued a more individualistic approach to integration generally, but are more 
likely to be present on executive committees, giving them more power in daily situations. The 
authors highlight that political integration is at least in part influenced by integration of immigrants 
into other elements of society. Since party leadership acts as “gatekeepers and facilitators of 
immigrant’s political participation,” the different ethnic groups experience that gatekeeping 
differently.13 Turks, for example, are asked to win the votes of their ethnic communities, but once 
elected, “councilors of Turkish origin often refrain from expressing ethnic group interests, despite 
their experience in Turkish organizations.”14 As a result, immigrant political action tied to “ethnic 
group interests” is at least to an extent constrained by the framework of the traditional labor party 
in the Netherlands. It is from this last aspect of Michon and Vermeuelen’s argument that this 
project takes its inspiration for looking at the agency of the two political actors throughout the 
newspaper articles. It follows that if immigrants’ ability to act freely as political actors or 
politicians is limited, they may seek to free themselves from the confines of that restrictive political 
entity. Whether or not the newspapers authors agree with the decision to found a new political 
party, might they frame Kuzu and Özturk’s actions along a discussion of agency? The distinction 
matters because it reflects greater society’s willingness to grant political actors of immigrant 




There are four hypotheses laid out for this project, the last two of which are broken down into two 
sub-hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that newspapers focus on Kuzu and Özturk’s struggles with 
the labor party PvdA instead of their substantive and ideological differences. Newspapers will 
most likely seek to highlight the rather sensational nature of the two mens’ departure from the 
labor party, particularly since the party was in government at the time. A potentially interesting 
 
11 Institute for Political Participation. 2006. “Meer Diversiteit in de Gemeenteraden.” Nieuwsbrief, pp. 7-9 
12 Ibid. 
13   Michon, Laure and Vermeulen, Floris. 2013 “Explaining Different Trajectories,” 597. 
14   Ibid., 604. 
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question is whether their departure will be framed as a further fragmentation of the Dutch political 
left, or as an assertion of Kuzu and Özturk’s independence. 
The second hypothesis is that newspapers focus on potential threats posed by Kuzu and 
Özturk, namely Turkish influence from Ankara and the potential formation of a national Islamic 
party. The third hypothesis can be split between the two newspapers being studied. Hypothesis 3a 
is that De Volkskrant will generally be more positive than De Telegraaf, and focused on policy 
issues. The logical foundation for this hypothesis is that De Volkskrant is generally regarded as 
more left-leaning then De Telegraaf. Hypothesis 3b is that, conversely, De Telegraaf will generally 
portray Kuzu and Özturk more negatively, than De Volkskrant does, and focus on issues of security 
and Islam. Hypothesis four, regarding the agency given to the two actors throughout the process 
of separation from the labor party, can also be separated into the two different newspapers. 
Hypothesis 4a is that De Volkskrant will portray Kuzu and Özturk as subjects more frequently than 
De Telegraaf. Hypothesis 4b, on the other hand, is that De Telegraaf will portray Kuzu and Özturk 




The articles analyzed in this project are from the two largest newspapers in the Netherlands, De 
Volkskrant and De Telegraaf. Collectively, the two newspapers generally cover much of the 
spectrum of Dutch newspaper journalism. They are both broadsheets with somewhat different 
histories and varying contemporary political orientations, which might influence their portrayal of 
Kuzu and Özturk. According to the World Press Encyclopedia, De Telegraaf, the most read daily 
newspaper in the Netherlands by circulation, generally aims to remain neutral editorially, but its 
reliance on flashy headlines and provocative cover pages occasionally incites or inflames right 
wing politicization. De Volkskrant, on the other hand, was historically the main newspaper for the 
Dutch catholic population. Since the 1960’s, however, it has sought to increase its circulation by 
capturing certain more educated groups, especially in Amsterdam.15 
 The dates under consideration in the analysis of the two newspapers span a relatively long 
period of time, from November 1st, 2014 until February 9th, 2016. The original aim of this project 
was to focus on a much narrower time-span, however arriving at a suitable sample size required 
expanding the date range by a few months. The one-and-a-quarter years bookmarked by the above 
dates represent the development and foundation of the DENK political party in the Netherlands. 
The timeline begins with the conflict within the governing Partij van de Arbeid (Labor), which 
was at the time in coalition with the center-right VVD. An intraparty struggle around integration 
resulted in the expulsion of two elected representatives in parliament of Turkish descent. Those 
two parliamentarians, originally relatively unknown, then gained national fame for their 
foundation of the DENK, the Immigrant-Rights based political party whose name means “Think” 
in Dutch and “Equality” in Turkish. Finally, the dates include the first full year of the party’s 
existence in parliament and does not include their first participation in a national election. The 
purpose of this restriction is to focus the data analysis on the actual foundation of the party, and 
the decision of its leaders to do so. The hope in doing so was to provide further insight into their 
ambitions and how they were received by the media, their self-professed representation of 
 
15 Bechtold, Brigitte H. "Netherlands." In World Press Encyclopedia, 2nd ed., edited by Amanda C. Quick, 644-656. 
Vol. 2. Detroit: Gale, 2003. Gale Virtual Reference Library (accessed February 12, 2018). 
http://link.galegroup.com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/apps/doc/CX3409900158/GVRL?u=unc_main&sid=GVRL&xid=895
780f6. 
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immigrant communities and interests, and above all their own and the media’s portrayal of the 
party’s future viability.  
The search terms used in the LexisNexis Academic research system were rather simple. 
Originally, the planned search term was simply the name of the political party, Denk. However, 
the temporal development of Kuzu and Özturk’s movement from separation with the PvdA to the 
establishment of new political party would not have lended itself to a successful analysis with that 
search term. As mentioned above, Kuzu and Özturk left the labor party in November of 2014, but 
did not officially found Denk until February of 2015. No newspaper articles would have come up 
in a search for “Denk” in that pivotal moment of political separation. Furthermore, simply 
searching for “Denk” would have ignored the highly personal element of the two politicians’ 
separation from the PvdA. As a result, the search terms finally decided upon were simply 
“Tunahun Kuzu” and “Selçuk Özturk.” Any articles in the two newspapers mentioning either of 
the two men during the study time period were included in the study.  
Every newspaper article sampled in this study was analyzed as a whole for article type, 
favorability/tone, portrayal, and policy focus. Every article was also analyzed on a paragraph-by-
paragraph basis for thematic content. Article types were included in data analysis primarily to 
explore differences in portrayal between opinion pieces and news articles. Favorability/tone was 
analyzed as either a positive portrayal, a negative portrayal, or a neutral portrayal in a news piece, 
or positive, neutral, or negative opinion in an op-ed. Often the decision to code an article between 
the three categories of favorability was made based on the adjectives used in the article, as well as 
the nature of the thematic elements discussed in the piece. The portrayal of the actors, Kuzu and 
Özturk, in the articles was coded as either a portrayal as subjects, or a portrayal as objects. The 
mechanism which differentiated between subjects and objects was whether or not the actors’ were 
allowed to speak for themselves in the article, or if the portrayals did not engage with Kuzu or 
Özturk’s own words. If an article discussed substantive policies at any point, it was coded as having 
a policy focus. Only articles that did not mention policies at all were coded as not having any 
policy focus whatsoever. Every theme discussed in an article was noted on an article-by-article 
bases in an excel worksheet for analysis. When highly-specific issues were discussed and similar 
objects were present, they were counted together. An example of this is the various Turkish civil 
organizations mentioned in the articles, they were combined under the theme “Turkish 
Organizations.” 
 There are several important limitations to this study. First of all, there were simply not 
enough articles published in the two largest Dutch newspapers to allow a narrower timeframe of 
study. Studying a shorter period of time would have allowed for a more in-depth analysis of less 
variables. For the purposes of this study, it was not possible to focus in on either the split with the 
PvdA or the foundation of the new party, both of which are topics that would ideally be studied 
independently of one another. Furthermore, the larger time-frame may skew what aspects of the 
two politicians’ journey are focused on, and perhaps not be as representative of how the papers 
actually view them. It is logical that at the moment of Kuzu and Özturk’s separation from the labor 
party, the majority of articles mentioning the two men would include discussion of that split in 
detail, as opposed to a more in-depth analysis of their substantive claims. On the other end, articles 









Before analysis, three articles were discarded from the sample for not actually discussing either 
Tunahan Kuzu or Selçuk Özturk. The final total count of articles analyzed was 99.  
 
 Article Type De Telegraaf De Volkskrant 
Entertainment News 2% 6% 
Interview 0% 4% 
News 72% 55% 
Opinion 26% 40% 
Profile 0% 4% 
Total Count 47 52 
Table 1: Percentage of Articles by Type 
 
 Table 1 looks at the types of articles published in the two newspapers. Notably, De 
Telegraaf published significantly more news pieces than De Volkskrant, which provided more 
varied coverage of Kuzu and Özturk, including more opinion pieces, two interviews, and two 
profiles.  
 
Coverage Tone De Volkskrant De Telegraaf 
Positive 21% 0% 
Neutral 60% 21% 
Negative 19% 79% 
Table 2: Percentage of Articles by Coverage Tone 
 
 The majority of articles published in De Volkskrant were neutral in tone, as table 2 
highlights, and approximately evenly distributed between positive and negative coverage. De 
Telegraaf, on the other hand, was overwhelmingly negative in its coverage of Kuzu and Özturk, 
with almost 80% of its articles falling into that category. An example of coverage that is ostensibly 
“news” but with negative tone is a line from De Telegraaf arguing that “Turkish influences destroy 
the Dutch integration dream,” in an article titled “Turkish lobby operates as a black cat in the 




News Interview News Opinion Profile 
Positive 0% 100% 8% 37% 0% 
Neutral 67% 0% 85% 16% 100% 
Negative 33% 0% 8% 37% 0% 
N/A 0% 0% 0% 11% 0% 
Count 3 2 26 19 2 
Table 3: De Volkskrant articles sorted by tone and article type 
 
 
16 Olmer, Bart. 2014. Turkse lobby opereert als zwarte kat in het donker; clubs zijn uit op macht voor eigen 
(religieuze) belangen. De Telegraaf, 15 november, 2014. 
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 De Volkskrant’s coverage of Kuzu and Özturk appears to speak favorably of the paper’s 
journalistic neutrality. The articles categorized as News and Opinion, the two sections with a 
significant enough count for analysis, are evenly balanced between positive and negative 
portrayals.  
 
Coverage Tone Entertainment News News Opinion 
Positive 0% 0% 0% 
Neutral 100% 24% 8% 
Negative 0% 76% 92% 
Count 1 34 12 
Table 4: De Telegraaf articles sorted by tone and article type 
 
 De Telegraaf, one the other hand, portrays the two men far more negatively. Above three-
quarters of all News articles and the vast majority of opinion pieces portray Kuzu and Özturk in a 
negative sense.  
 
Actor Portrayal De Volkskrant De Telegraaf 
Subjects 60% 21% 
Objects 31% 77% 
N/A 9% 2% 
Count 52 47% 
Table 5: Percentage of articles by Actor Portrayal 
 
 De Volkskrant was significantly more likely to portray the two politicians as subjects in the 
political process than De Telegraaf, which frequently portrayed them without actually engaging 
their voices. A particularly egregious example of this was an article titled “The Turkish Trojan 
Horses” which argued they had simply been “voting cattle” for the PvdA and had “become more 
radical by the week.”17 
 
Policy Focus? De Volkskrant De Telegraaf 
Yes 27% 17% 
No 73% 83% 
Table 6: Percentage of Articles by Policy Focus 
 
 Table 6 highlights that neither newspaper was very willing to engage with Kuzu, Özturk, 
and other immigrant groups on questions of substantive policy issues. The majority of articles, 
instead, focused on the two politicians, their actions and attitudes, and what the foundation of the 
party might mean for the Netherlands. This number is potentially skewed upwards because several 
of the articles counted in this metric discuss parliamentary proceedings in which Denk participated, 
which were inherently about policy. Very few articles actually discussed Denk’s policy goals.  
 
 
17 de Winther,Paul Jansen en Wouter. 2014. De turkse paarden van troje; PvdA'ers schetsen een onthutsend beeld 
van hun voormalige partijgenoten tunahan kuzu en selzuk öztürk. De Telegraaf, 15 november, 2014. 
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De Volkskrant Count Percentage De Telegraaf Count Percentage 
Labor split 16 31% Labor split 17 35% 
Seat theft 11 21% Behavior 14 29% 





Policy 7 13% Seat theft 8 17% 
Behavior 5 10% Integration policy 5 10% 
Table 7: Most discussed theme by newspaper 
 
 Finally, table 7 explores the thematic differences between the two newspapers. In line with 
table 6, neither newspaper appears to engage with questions of policy on a significant level. The 
split with the PvdA was the most frequently discussed issue in both De Volkskrant and De 
Telegraaf. Following on tables 2 and 4, De Telegraaf discusses the behavior of Kuzu and Özturk 
much more frequently, and comments on the two men’s potential ties to the Erdogan regime in 




The results confirm several of the hypotheses suggested at the beginning of this paper, and reject 
at least one of them. In the study period examined, both newspapers wrote the most about the 
decision of Tunahan Kuzu and Selçuk Özturk to leave the PvdA and take their seats with them. De 
Telegraaf in particularly frequently repeated that Özturk had said “may Allah punish you” to a 
fellow member of the PvdA before leaving their last meeting as PvdA parliamentarians. 
Hypothesis two, regarding Turkish influence, is generally rejected. Whereas De Telegraaf 
dedicated approximately a quarter of its articles to discussing potential influence from Ankara, De 
Volkskrant barely touched the issue at all.  
 Hypothesis three is supported in part, with De Volkskrant portraying Özturk and Kuzu in a 
relatively much more positive light than De Telegraaf. Contrary to what was hypothesized, 
however, De Volkskrant did not engage the politicians on substantive policy issues in the vast 
majority of its articles. Hypothesis four is confirmed by the data, as De Volkskrant, the more liberal 
paper, was far more likely to let Denk’s founders speak for themselves in its portrayal of them than 
De Telegraaf.  
 An unanticipated trend which came up frequently in the coverage of the two politicians 
was the concept of seat-theft and an in-depth discussion of what it means for Dutch politics. In 
both papers, close to 20% of articles discussed the issue. This may be a result of the rather extended 
time-frame discussed as a limitation of the research. During the period of study, Norbert Klein also 
left the 50Plus party, bringing the question of seat-theft back into the newspapers where Kuzu and 
Özturk would be brought up again.  
 Returning to the literature review and what this study might imply for the larger discussion 
on integration, it appears that the left-leaning newspaper is more willing to grant Kuzu, Özturk and 
perhaps by extension immigrant communities at large, more agency in the political process in The 
Netherlands. One article in De Volkskrant actually discussed their seat theft as a consummate act 
of integration into Dutch political society.18 Granting them a certain subjectivity at least 
 
18 Korteweg, Ariejan 2014. De splinterkamer. de Volkskrant, 19 november, 2014. 
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acknowledges that they have the right to form a party if they so desire, and signals that perhaps 
the left-of-center side of the political spectrum is willing to grant immigrants greater political room 
for maneuver. Curiously, little attention was paid at all to the presence of other immigrants or 
descendants of immigrants in parliament. The elevated political presence of immigrants in the 
Netherlands did not appear to factor into the coverage of Denk.  
De Telegraaf, however, focused quite heavily on Kuzu and Özturk’s Turkish background. 
Denk was characterized in that paper as “The long arm of Ankara,”19 supporting Michon and 
Vermeulen’s hypothesis that Turkish politicians are especially stigmatized for their ethnic 
connections in The Netherlands.  
In the most recent Dutch election in 2017, Kuzu and Özturk managed not only to maintain 
their own seats in parliament, but Denk also won a third seat which would be filled by a politican 
of Moroccan descent, Farid Azarkan. This paper has sought to contextualize the arrival of Denk in 
the Dutch political arena through the lens of the two mainstream papers in the country. Although 
acceptance of the party’s existence appears to be filtered along left-right political leanings in the 
Dutch media it is clear that Denk has at least some mandate from immigrant populations in The 
Netherlands and will remain a voice in Dutch politics and immigrant integration in the future. 
Finally, returning to Hochschild and Mellenkopf’s framework of immigrant integration, the partial 
acceptance of Kuzu and Özturk’s departure from the PvdA and foundation of Denk by at least the 
left-leaning newspaper in the Netherlands indicates that immigrant populations in the Netherlands 
may now exist within the theoretical third stage of political integration: the actors have been 
changed by the political system and they, at least in part, have changed it.20 
 
Appendix 1: Articles analyzed 
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Kamer: Kolencentrales zo snel mogelijk dicht. 2015. de Volkskrant, 27 november, 2015.  
 
19 Mikkers, Ruud 2014. PvdA krijgt klap; partij zou elf zetels overhouden. De Telegraaf, 17 november, 2014. 
20 Hochschild, Jennifer, and John Mollenkopf. 2009. “Modeling Immigrant Political Incorporation,” 15 
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Introduction 
Since around 2015, Germany and other European countries have experienced a large increase in 
the number of refugees21 entering their countries. As a result, there has been much pushback from 
native Germans against this new foreign presence; recent terrorist attacks carried out by radical 
Islamists throughout Europe have only made Europeans more skeptical of allowing refugees in 
their countries22. Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel has been especially criticized for her open-
door policy. Last year, she and Interior Minister Horst Seehofer have clashed heavily on the issue 
of migration and refugees, threatening the already fragile government coalition23. However, more 
recently, Germany has decreased the number of refugees accepted while increasing deportations 
to other EU countries24. While the number of refugees is showing no signs of decreasing to pre-
2015 numbers in the near future, Germany and other European countries are coming to terms with 
the fact that they must not only offer refuge but also successfully accommodate these refugees. 
Current discussions of the refugee crisis frame it as a new phenomenon, but these discussions 
ignore other influxes of refugees in Germany’s past25. It would be beneficial for German 
politicians to also reference what they have done in the past when they are looking at how they 
should approach this “crisis”. The issue of integration and assimilation has been a salient topic in 
recent discussions surrounding refugees. On one hand, many Germans expect the newly arrived 
refugees to fully assimilate to their customs, but many refugees are not willing to completely forfeit 
their own culture for Germany’s. In contrast to earlier times of refugee migration, these refugees 
are coming from places whose cultures are viewed as antithetical to German and European culture. 
     In this essay, I will investigate how German society approaches the question of 
assimilation/integration through an analysis of the mainstream media representation of refugees in 
Welcome to Germany. I will show how the unidimensional and shallow character of the refugee in 
this film is indicative of a German society that is unwilling to accept refugees as fully human with 
 
21 In this paper, I will use a common, broad definition of a refugee: anyone who is fleeing from 
their homeland because of persecution, which keeps them from being able to return. 
22 For example, the March 2019 Utrecht shootings in the Netherlands, December 2018 
Strasbourg attack in France, August 2017 Barcelona attacks, May 2017 Manchester bombing in 
the United Kingdom, July 2016 Nice attack in France, December 2015 Cologne attacks in 
Germany, and November 2015 Paris attacks.   
23Schmidt, Nadine, and Judith Vonberg. "Merkel Makes Deal with Interior Minister on 
Migration Dispute." CNN. July 02, 2018. Accessed March 24, 2019. 
http://www.cnn.com/2018/07/02/europe/merkel-seehofer-government-intl/index.html.  
24 Shubert, Atika, and Nadine Schmidt. "Germany Rolls up Refugee Welcome Mat to Face off 
Right-wing Threat." CNN. January 27, 2019. Accessed March 24, 2019. 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/26/europe/germany-refugee-deportations-intl/index.html. 
25 Poutrus, Patrice. “Refugee Reports.” Migration, Memory, and Diversity, edited by Cornelia 
Wilhelm, Berghahn Books, 2017, 86-107.; El-Tayeb, Fatima. Undeutsch: Die Konstruktion Des 
Anderen in Der Postmigrantischen Gesellschaft. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2016. 
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complexities and faults. Welcome to Germany is a popular German film centering around a 
family’s decision to adopt a Nigerian refugee named Diallo that promotes a narrative that is 
counteractive to progressive work surrounding the political and social treatment of refugees in the 
country. I will analyze how Diallo’s role in the movie and his relation to the Hartmanns, the family 
that takes him in, contribute to a more close-minded view of refugees. I will also put this into the 
context of the film’s relative success in Germany and how the movie was received by the public. 
 
Anti-Blackness within the Refugee Crisis 
 
The majority of news coverage and media portrayals of the refugee crisis in Germany feature 
Syrian refugees, but these portrayals do not give a complete view of the demographics of the crisis. 
Although Syrian refugees do make up a large portion of the German refugee population in recent 
years, there is also a sizeable number of African refugees in Germany. For example, Eritrean, 
Nigerian, and Somalian refugees constitute the three largest percentages of African refugees26. 
Nigerian refugees, usually fleeing from attacks carried out by the Islamic terrorist group Boko 
Haram, made up 7% (6,141 refugees) of the refugee population that came to Germany in the first 
half of 2018. Eritrean refugees, who are fleeing from compulsory conscription in the national 
military, made up 4.3% (3,722) of refugees27. Additionally, Somalian refugees escaping inter-
country warfare made up 3.5% (3,260) of refugees. In contrast, Syrian refugees made up 26.4% of 
the refugee population in the first half of 2018, a marked decrease from previous years28 29. Despite 
their lack of representation, African refugees make up a significant amount of the refugee 
population in Germany. 
     In addition to facing Islamophobia and xenophobia, African refugees must endure anti-Black 
racism in Germany. This racism is not solely present in the social context. Rather, it exists 
throughout the German political system, particularly in local German police forces. In her book 
Undeutsch, Fatima El-Tayeb details specific infractions against African refugees by German 
police. In one instance, a police officer forced an African refugee to get naked, pushed him into a 
cell, and sprayed tear gas into the cell. Another group of police offers staged a mock execution of 
an African refugee in which one officer pressed his gun into the refugee’s temple while another 
officer fired a shot into the air30. Although Germany prefers not to recognize the conception of 
race, because the term “race” is associated with the racist policies of the Third Reich, it cannot 
ignore the effects and prevalence of racism in its country31. 
 
26 In the first half of 2018, Nigerians made up 26.3% of African refugees; Eritreans made up 
16% of African refugees; and Somalians made up 14% of African refugees. 
27 The exact reason that refugees are fleeing Eritrea is unclear because there are many conflicting 
accounts about the situation in the country. Some say that the government is repressive while 
others claim that refugees are promoting a false narrative about the country and its leader in 
order to be granted refugee status (Smith). 
28 In the first half of 2016, Syrian refugees made up 44% of the refugee population. 
29 "Asylzahlen." Bundesamt Für Migration Und Flüchtlinge. June 02, 2017. Accessed March 24, 
2019. http://www.bamf.de/DE/Infothek/Statistiken/Asylzahlen/asylzahlen-node.html. 
30 El-Tayeb, Undeutsch, 214. 
31 Fehrenbach, Heide. Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and 
America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. 
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     Amnesty International recently produced a report criticizing Germany and Europe for 
widespread anti-black racism present within their country32. As El-Tayeb states, Germans still 
perceive black people as “fundamentally biologically different from ‘normal’ people”33. Could 
this be the reason for the lack of inclusion of African refugees in media portrayals of the refugee 
crisis? It would be dangerous to discount the violence that Syrian refugees face due to xenophobia 
and Islamophobia, but it would also be unwise to ignore the violence that African immigrants face 
due to the combination of xenophobia, Islamophobia, and anti-Blackness.  
     In light of this troubling sociohistorical context, I have chosen to focus on how film treats this 
topic because one cannot discount the potential media representations can have for giving refugees 
some legitimacy to their claims to refugee status. Films, even when fictional, can heavily shape 
someone’s knowledge about a historical event especially if they knew little about the event 
beforehand. In terms of the refugee crisis, most Germans have not had extended amounts of 
personal contact with a refugee. Therefore, a film about a refugee will have a large influence on 
shaping Germans’ perceptions of refugees.  In their paper about media discourse on the refugee 
crisis, Fotopoulos and Kaimaklioti emphasize the role that media has in influencing society and 
hold that “media [can] contribute to the reproduction of stereotypes”34. When audiences see 
stereotypes being reinforced in characters, they believe those stereotypes to be true. Even though 
it is not clear to what extent film and media can affect audience opinions on issues, evidence shows 
that film does exert some influence. With this in mind, we must seriously consider and analyze the 
portrayals and stories that we see in film and how the lack of representation of African refugees in 
German media could be responsible for less acceptance to African claims to refugee status as 
legitimate. However, just having these portrayals of African refugees in the media is not enough; 
we must further consider what they contain and interrogate what these portrayals mean. 
 
White Savior Film 
 
     The film, Welcome to Germany (2016), directed by white German director Simon Verhoeven, 
presents the character Diallo as one of those aforementioned “exceptions.” In contrast to the 
majority of media coverage, he is an African refugee, but his character is essentially domesticated 
and made docile, embodying Germany’s ideal refugee: he is more than willing to fully assimilate 
to German culture and work to earn his way. The film begins with a despondent Mrs. Hartmann 
who, since entering retirement, has become bored with her life and is looking for a way to shake 
things up. After Mrs. Hartmann declares that she wishes to take in a refugee, the upper-class 
bourgeois Hartmann family fosters Diallo, a Nigerian refugee hoping to be granted asylum by the 
German state. In addition, Diallo works to fix the Hartmann’s familial issues while the Hartmanns 
teach him Western values that seem new to him due to his upbringing in a small Nigerian village. 
Diallo’s chances for asylum are threatened by several situations he gets into because of the 
Hartmann family, such as a house party that results in a visit from the police and a rap video that 
grandson Basti films at school using Diallo, and several scantily clad women, as extras. But in the 
end, the Hartmann family is instrumental in him being granted asylum. Throughout the film, Diallo 
 
32 El-Tayeb, Undeutsch, 215. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Fotopoulos, Stergios, and Margarita Kaimaklioti. "Media Discourse on the Refugee Crisis: On 
What Have the Greek, German and British Press Focused?" European View15, no. 2 (2016): 
265-79. doi:10.1007/s12290-016-0407-5. 
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is pushed further and further away from the center of the movie as the family’s problems take over 
more of the plot. Due to this marginalization, the film becomes less about the issues that refugees 
face in Germany and more about solving the problems within the Hartmann family. 
     Welcome to Germany functions as a typical “white savior film”35. White savior films usually 
include a benevolent white protagonist whose main goal throughout the film is to aide a poor 
and/or helpless minority. Additionally, these films work to support a narrative that people of color 
must rely on white people to help them out of their dire situations. Another issue with these movies 
is that they often ignore structural causes of racism and name one bad white person or a group of 
bad white people as the cause of the racism that the person of color faces, allowing the audience 
watching the film to feel absolved of any racist guilt, even while they remain complicit in racist 
structures36. In Welcome to Germany, the Hartmanns, specifically Mrs. Hartmann and her daughter 
Sophie, function as the white saviors; they are the benevolent Germans eager to deliver a refugee 
from his suffering. By taking Diallo in from the refugee center, they are bringing him into much 
better living circumstances and even removing him from the racism and danger he faced at the 
center. Diallo repays them by working tirelessly to help Mrs. Hartmann with handyman projects 
around the house. In the end, the Hartmanns help Diallo obtain his refugee status by testifying 
before court to his character and all that he has done for them. In actuality, one family’s emotional 
testimony would not be enough to convince the German government to grant someone refugee 
status, especially because of strict regulations such as Dublin II37 38. But Welcome to Germany 
does not do much to address the real issues that refugees face in the country. Instead, it feeds into 
Germans’ white savior complex by showing a story where Germans open up their home to an 
immensely grateful refugee. 
     This film is not about Diallo and his experiences as a refugee, rather it is about Germans and 
Germany. The Hartmann family can be seen as a representation of Germany as a whole; this 
metaphorical connection is more apparent when looking at the difference in the English and 
German titles of the movie: the German title, Willkommen bei den Hartmanns, directly translates 
to “Welcome to the Hartmanns”, contrasting the more ambiguous English title, Welcome to 
Germany. It is worth noting that one of the posters that was marketed for the film features the 
names of the actors for all the main characters except for the man who plays Diallo, Eric Kabongo. 
Diallo lacks complex characterization and shows no development throughout the film, illuminating 
the fact that he occupies a supplemental rather than central role in the film. For instance, Diallo’s 
identification as Muslim is barely mentioned in the movie. Furthermore, Diallo’s character has no 
remnants of Nigerian culture. The only time he mentions life at home is when he explains how 
Boko Haram destroyed his village and killed his family. One might expect a film that hopes to 
truly be progressive on the refugee issue would show aspects of both cultures instead of just 
focusing on a refugee attempting to embrace only German culture. If the Hartmanns are a metaphor 
 
35 Hughey, Matthew W. The White Savior Film: Content, Critics, and Consumption. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2014. 
36 Hughey, The White Savior Film, 167. 
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for the country as a whole, the movie shows the extent to which Germany expects refugees to do 
both physical and emotional labor in exchange for a chance at refuge in Germany. 
     A film centering around a family instead of the refugee can do little in advancing the discussion 
on how refugees are treated. Rather than concentrating on what problems refugees face upon 
arrival in Germany, Welcome to Germany focuses its discussions around how the country is 
coming to terms with itself and attempting to define its identity among this new influx of 
foreigners. The characters in the film offer conflicting answers to questions as to what Germany 
should do next and the film itself fails to take a solid position on the issue of refugees and how 
they should be treated in Germany.  
     Typically, white savior films contain either one or a few white villains on which the blame for 
racism is placed. In this film, there are two main villains: one that threatens Germans and the other 
that threatens refugees. Diverging from the trend of white villains, the villain threatening Germany 
is represented through the Muslim character Rayhan, the refugee revealed to be a terrorist at the 
end of the movie. On the other hand, the villains threatening refugees are a group of neo-Nazi 
protesters who gather outside the Hartmann house to protest Diallo’s presence. Rayhan’s character 
is consistently shown as being vehemently opposed to both Germany and assimilating to German 
culture. His role in the movie implies that Germans should be suspicious of any refugees who seem 
unwilling to assimilate to German culture. In contrast to Rayhan, the neo-Nazi protesters do not 
represent a serious threat. Even though they surround the house with torches and posters, they are 
presented as comical, diminishing and invalidating the dangers to which refugees and other 
minorities are exposed in Germany. The absurdity of the protestors outside detracts from the real 
dangers that refugees and minorities face and paints the source of racism and xenophobia in 
Germany as coming from a small number of eccentric Germans. When the protestors do begin to 
act dangerously (i.e. throwing items through the windows of the house), the family retreats into 
the house towards safety. Operating with the interpretation that the Hartmann family is a metaphor 
for Germany, by retreating inside the house and separating themselves from the racist, xenophobic, 
and Islamophobic protesters, the film is saying that these ideals do not belong in Germany. The 
film once again underestimates the role of racists and racism in German society when it writes off 
Mr. Hartmann’s rudeness towards Tarek, a younger doctor played by an actor of Austrian and 
Tunisian descent, as a product of Mr. Hartmann’s disenchantment with the aging process and 
jealousy of Tarek’s youth instead of as a byproduct of his racism. However, this implication that 
racism is anti-German only provides an ineffective and superficial response to those refugees have 
been subjected to racism in Germany while ignoring the role that structural racism plays in 
Germany’s treatment of refugees. 
     Welcome to Germany has won six film awards and been nominated for several others, including 
a nomination for Best European Comedy at the European Film Awards. Most notably, the film’s 
director, Simon Verhoeven, was awarded the German Cinema Award for Peace at the Munich 
Film Festival. The award is reserved for films “with a humanist, socially relevant dimension” that 
aim to “[build] bridges and [inspire] tolerance and humanitarianism”39 (“Awards & Winners”). 
Although one cannot deny the film’s popularity, its acquisition of a peace award highlights the fact 
that many see the film as progressive. Contrary to the description of the German Cinema Award 
for Peace, Welcome to Germany does nothing to “build bridges”. Instead of advocating for a more 
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accepting outlook on the refugees coming into the country, it only works to examine the different 
ways in which Germans have responded to the refugee crisis. 
 
Liberalism and Racism 
 
Despite it being marketed as a film providing both comedy and progressive commentary on the 
refugee issue, Welcome to Germany does not actually advocate a position within the issue of the 
refugee crisis. When characters in the film actually discuss the refugee crisis, their comments are 
not liberal or progressive; rather they are uncertain and still skeptical of the migrants coming into 
the country. In my paper, I will define “progressive” an ideal that supports a deviation from 
traditional ideas and practices through change and reform. Lastly, although in layman’s terms 
“liberal” has come to be defined as progressively antiracist, I will define liberalism as an ideology 
that advocates for the protection of minorities against the “abuse of an overbearing state.”40 While 
the film attempts to advocate a portrait of Germans as generally accepting of refugees, it actually 
demonstrates that Germans are only open to these exemplary migrants. In an interview, the 
director, Simon Verhoeven, praises his film for treating the migration crisis with “dignity and 
emotion…[and] in a humanistic way”. Furthermore, in addressing the issue of Islam in the movie 
he claims that the movie attempts to question “certain conservative aspects of Islam.”41 Although 
it would be irresponsible to discount the conservative aspects of Islam, the film only shows the 
negative aspects of Islam. Diallo is Muslim, but this character trait is barely explored in the film. 
     The film’s conflicting ideas surrounding the role of Muslims and Islam in Germany are 
presented through the lack of multifaceted representations of Islam. In particular, the film has 
multiple instances where German fear and suspicion of Muslims is validated. Recounting a night 
out in Cologne to her mother, Sophie explains how she was almost attacked by a group of Middle 
Eastern men but saved by a taxi driver. When asked by her mother, Sophie states that she is not 
sure whether or not they were refugees. Mrs. Hartmann is immediately suspicious that these men 
who attacked her daughter were refugees, highlighting her overall mistrust of refugees. 
Furthermore, Sophie’s story could be a reference to the New Year’s attacks in Cologne in 2015 
where approximately 80 women were attacked by groups of male refugees totaling close to 
1,000.42 In addition, Mrs. Hartmann, who is portrayed as more tolerant and accepting, has a vivid 
nightmare about the Islamic State taking over Germany, which equates Muslims and their presence 
in Germany as threatening. In her dream, Ms. Hartmann is barred from entering her local bakery 
because she is not wearing a burka; the baker and his staff are wearing long beards and burkas 
while speaking in a Bavarian dialect. Her dream shows that she believes that the Muslims entering 
the country will disrupt the German way of life by refusing to assimilate into German culture and 
instead forcefully pushing their culture onto the native German populace. Furthermore, her 
nightmare highlights a xenophobic suspicion that many of the refugees are secretly members of 
ISIS attempting to infiltrate the country. Throughout the film, Diallo is suspected by police of 
being a member of an ISIS terrorist cell. However, it is revealed at the end of the film that the real 
culprit was Rayhan. Scenes like these just mentioned validate German fear and uneasiness 
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surrounding the admission of Muslim refugees. Instead of exhibiting openly Muslim characters 
occupying positive roles, the film capitalizes on the negative stigma surrounding Middle Eastern 
Muslim refugees, ostracizing them from German society and making the existence of someone 
who is both Muslim and German seem impossible. The portrayal of Islam in the film also brings 
up the discussion of the good refugee versus the bad refugee. Rayhan, a refugee living in the 
refugee center who is revealed to be a terrorist at the end of the film, is against assimilating to 
German customs and refuses to renounce his “traditional” ideas. For example, the director of the 
refugee center mentions that Rayhan tries to keep the women from enrolling in classes at the 
refugee home. Diallo, on the other hand, is eager to assimilate to German culture and considers 




Welcome to Germany shows how including a representation of a migrant that is not necessarily 
bad does not make that representation helpful to achieving a general approval of migrants. In order 
to push the discussion forward and encourage greater acceptance, migrants must be portrayed as 
complex and diverse and deserving of equal and just treatment regardless of their flaws. 
Representations like that of Diallo and Mamoudou Gassama shield Europeans from the reality of 
the situation and give unrealistic expectations of refugees; not every asylum seeker will be able to 
save toddlers dangling from buildings or have Diallo’s perfect attitude. Both of these instances 
demonstrate the fact that Europeans are not completely open to accepting these refugees as humans 
who are attempting to flee a life-threatening situation and are in need of shelter. Instead, they see 
them as a threat to their security and economic wellbeing. Although Gassama and Diallo are both 
deserving of the statuses that they were granted, every migrant cannot be expected to meet such 
high standards in order to have a valid claim to residency. Viewing migrants through such an 
unrealistic lens decreases the likelihood of an understanding between Europeans and these newly 
arrived migrants since Europeans will most likely never encounter these perfect examples of 
migrants. Furthermore, Europeans are then unwilling to accept any flaws in these migrants that 
they do encounter. Films that negatively influence an audience’s opinion are dangerous to those 
hoping to advocate a more progressive agenda. Such representations do not work to improve the 
systematic treatment of migrants. 
     Far from progressive, the racist, xenophobic, and Islamophobic undertones of the movie 
illustrate that Germany has still not moved forward from the more racist and close-minded ideas 
of its past. Rather than advocating for a more accepting and open outlook towards the refugee 
crisis, Welcome to Germany validates Germany’s fear and suspicion of the migrants entering the 
country. Through the genre of comedy, the film evades any discussion of the violence associated 
with racism and xenophobia and instead invites the German audience to laugh at Diallo’s 
backwardness43 (Malik).  
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Multi-Level Governance in Eastern Europe After the Fall of the USSR: How 
Russian and Ukrainian Post-Soviet Governmental Institutions Affect Crimea 
 




Regional authority is not always uniformly applied to all territories. How federal governments treat 
special regions differentiates from how they treat other sub-entities within their jurisdiction. One 
of the most interesting examples of a special region is Crimea because its story is not connected to 
just one country, but rather two: Russia and Ukraine. This paper will feature a two-pronged 
analysis of Crimea and its relationships with the aforementioned countries: first, it will examine 
late-USSR and post-Soviet history as an explanation for Crimean dependence on its surrounding 
nations, and secondly, it will analyze governmental institutions in Russia and Ukraine to determine 
how Crimea fits into each system. This paper will use these findings to elucidate plausible reasons 
for Crimea’s bid for autonomy, and, subsequently, Russia’s successful annexation of the region. 
 
Keywords: regionalism, Russia, multi-level governance, Ukraine, territorial conflict 
 
Introduction 
Regional authority is not always uniformly applied to all territories. How federal governments treat 
special regions differentiates from how they treat other sub-entities within their jurisdiction. One 
of the most interesting examples of a special region is Crimea because its story is not connected to 
just one country, but rather two: Russia and Ukraine. This paper will feature a two-pronged 
analysis of Crimea and its relationships with the aforementioned countries: first, it will examine 
late-USSR and post-Soviet history as an explanation for Crimean dependence on its surrounding 
nations, and secondly, it will analyze governmental institutions in Russia and Ukraine to determine 
how Crimea fits into each system. This paper will use these findings to elucidate plausible reasons 




While the 20th century saw Crimea change hands many times between Russia and Ukraine, the 
focus of this paper is on the Crimean question after the fall of the Soviet Union; therefore, it will 
only dive into the history of the Gorbachev years and after. However, briefly understanding how 
Russian supremacy dictated history prior to this period is also important. 
     In this story, there are three distinct ethnic groups, the Russian, the Ukrainians, and the Tatars 
of Crimea. As a result, there are also three different views as to where Crimea should fit in the 
geopolitical map of Eastern Europe: the Tatars essentially believe that they are the only people 
indigenous to Crimea, and that “the Crimea is their only homeland”.44  
     Because of ethnic cleansing and other misfortunes that befell the Tatars in the 20th century, 
including nationalist movements that garnered little support, the Russian and Ukrainian views of 
Crimean history are the ones that of particular relevance in this paper. The Tatar view, while having 
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some importance, is not nearly as influential, as Crimea was never independent under Soviet 
control, and has never been since the fall of the USSR. Russia’s view dictates that Crimea has 
always played a historically important and symbolic role in Russian history dating back to the 
Tsarist Russian Empire, and that it has always naturally been part of the Russian world. On the 
other hand, the Ukrainian version asserts that Crimea has always been linked to Ukraine more 
deeply than, and prior to, its linkage with Russia, due to geographical proximity, cultural affinities 
and ethnic similarities.45 While this helps to explain the tension between the two countries over 
Crimean supremacy, one final, but crucial factor comes into play: in 1954, under Soviet control, 
Crimea and Sevastopol were transferred to the Soviet Republic of the Ukraine.46 Because of this, 
many tense negotiations between Russia and modern-day Ukraine occurred during the period 
between the fall of the Soviet Union and the ratification of the Crimean constitution.  
     Many of these arguments stemmed from the question of Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet. 
Many Russians argue that Sevastopol was subordinate to Moscow until the fall of the Soviet 
Union; therefore, it should rightfully be under Russian control. Meanwhile, Ukraine asserts that 
Sevastopol was transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic along with the rest of Crimea 
in 1954. The question over whether Ukraine or Russia should inherit Sevastopol and the Black Sea 
Fleet was one of the major disputes throughout the rest of the 1990s.47 Notably, due to over-
cautious leadership, Ukraine was never able to fully gain control over the Black Sea Fleet, leaving 
the door open for Russian contention. These tensions came to a head in 1992 when both Ukrainian 
parliamentary speaker Kravchuck and Russian President Yeltsin nationalized the Black Sea Fleet, 
and then decided to back down following escalated tension between the two countries.48 While the 
Black Sea Fleet was eventually split evenly, Russia continued to demand that Sevastopol be leased 
to Russia. Eventually, Russia and Ukraine were both granted ports in Sevastopol.49  
     In 1998, the Crimean Constitution that was ratified stated: 1) The Republic of Crimea was an 
autonomous component of Ukraine 2) the Crimea does not possess separate citizenship to that in 
the remainder of Ukraine 3) Sevastopol is part of the Crimea 4) Russia, Ukrainian and Tatar are 
official languages, while Russian is the official language of government and business.50 While 
there were more provisions, these four are chief in explaining, firstly, that the final constitution 
appeased both the Ukraine and Tatars by affording autonomy, yet remaining part of the Ukraine, 
including Sevastopol.  However, it also recognizes strong Russian influence as the official 
language of government is Russian.   
     After adopting the constitution, the leadership in Crimea continued to push for more and more 
autonomy. A combination of resurgent Tatars in the region that want independence and pro-
Russian civilians put continuous pressure on Kiev to relinquish some control of the region.51 While 
the constitution of ‘98, and the Black Sea Fleet agreements of ‘96 seemed to de-escalate the issues 
surrounding the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine, they also show continued unrest and 
lack of permanent solution. While this story illustrates the growing conflict between Russia and 
the Ukraine, as well as the growing push for Crimean autonomy, it does not address why it was so 
easy for Russia to annex Crimea in 2014. Russian and Ukrainian institutional development and 
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relative treatment of Crimea can be a possible explanation for why Crimean nationalists favor 
Russian control. 
 
Post-Soviet Institutions in Russia 
 
Almost immediately after Gorbachev's resignation, Yeltsin began nationalizing commodities that 
once belonged to all of the USSR, and revitalizing a solely Russian military. Russia became the 
USSR’s successor state, taking over its place in international organizations, including the United 
Nations. It also assumed all Soviet debt in exchange for the former USSR’s assets abroad.52 Thus, 
Russia immediately was met with international success and a relatively smooth political transition, 
unlike many of the other former Soviet states. Furthermore, Russia’s Constitution outlines 
governmental institutions, which account for the widespread geopolitical diversity of the country. 
     The Russian Parliament, also known as the Federal Assembly consists of two houses: the Duma 
(lower house) and the Federation Council (upper house). The Duma consists of 450 deputies, who 
are popularly elected based on party affiliation.53 On the other hand, the Federation Council is 
comprised of two representatives, one from the legislative branch and one from the executive, from 
each constituent region within Russia (called sub”ekty or subjects). The Federal Council overseas 
different areas of jurisdiction, as well as approving or rejecting presidential decrees, while the 
Duma rules on presidential appointment, raises issues of confidence in government, rules on 
amnesty, and brings impeachment charges. 
 
 
Fig. 1: The Structure of the Russian Federal Assembly 54 
 
Thus, the Parliament of Russia recognizes both party agendas via the Duma as well as regional 
agendas via the Federal Council. The Duma is the dominant of the two houses,55  
     The other important governmental structure in post-Soviet Russia, as is relevant to this paper, 
is the federal system. As aforementioned, Russia is a federation made up of 89 regional sub”ekty. 
These sub”ekty can be classified in four ways: republics, krya, oblasti and cities of federal 
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subordination, autonomous districts and autonomous oblasti.56 Of the 89, 21 of these units are 
classified as “republics”. In addition to other concessions afforded to the sub”ekty, republics are 
constitutionally permitted to have their own language and to adopt constitutions of their own (other 
subject may only have charters).57 While it is stated in the Constitution that all sub”ekty are equal, 
this is clearly not the case. Furthermore, there is another issue in the Russian Constitution where 
seven sub”ekty (krya and oblasti) contain nine other sub”ekty (autonomous districts).58  
     While this system is extremely asymmetrical, exacerbated by the fact that Yeltsin relied on the 
old system of nomenklatura to further push certain regional agendas, it does allot significant power 
to autonomous regions, i.e. the Republic of Crimea. However, under President Putin, the 
persistence of Soviet nomenklatura began to dwindle, and many Constitutional reforms began to 
centralize power under Moscow and take power away from the regions. The Russian Federation 
maintains sole control over foreign, defense and security policy, taxation, federal budget, customs 
regulations, state borders, the economic system, etc...much like other federations. Shared rule 
between the regions and the central government comes into play on issues such as natural 
resources, law and order, public health and education.59 Issues that are not encompassed by shared 
rule, or granted to the Russian Federation, are left under regional jurisdiction. This resembles the 
US constitution in which issues not specifically stated in the Constitution are under state control, 
which gives a rather large amount of jurisdiction to the sub entities.  
     However, in recent years, President Vladimir Putin’s desire to “reassert central control in the 
country’s regions” has watered down some of the perceived power of the regions. Under Putin, 
the regions grouped the sub”ekty into seven administrative regions. This effectively created 
another layer of intermediary government, which checks some of the regional power. The Putin 
regime also passed legislation stating that heads of territorial legislatures could not serve in the 
Federal Council, only lower representatives.60 Finally, Putin created the State Council to provide 
another venue for governors to converse with the president, since they were banned from serving 
on the Federal Council. This rearranges the hierarchy in Russia to mimic a more vertical pattern. 
     Given this summary of Russian institutions, it appears that in the years immediately following 
the collapse of the USSR, Yeltsin’s reforms and the Constitution would have given the Crimea an 
advantageous place in the political system of Russia. As a former Autonomous Republic of the 
Soviet Union, it would be classified as a republic under the federal system, and granted a 
significant portion of regional independence. Under Putin, it appears Crimea loses some of its 
autonomy, as the power wrangling from the Federation Council shows. However, it does not seem 
to have an effect on the status of Crimea as an Autonomous Republic. Therefore, it still seems that 
Russia’s federal system grants Crimea generous self-rule. Furthermore, Russia recognizes three 
federal cities - individual cities that are sub”ekty, granted the same amount of regional authority 
as the rest of the 86 sub”ekty. One of these three cities is Sevastopol, once again showing the 
amount of importance that Russia places on the Crimea.  
 
Post-Soviet Instability and Political Obstacles in Ukraine  
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Following the breakup of the USSR, Ukraine faced many decisions regarding how to govern itself, 
now that it was no longer subservient to the Supreme Soviet of Russia. One of the major issues 
with this is that Ukraine, historically throughout the Soviet regime, was divided regionally in 
loyalty. While western Ukraine favored Kiev, the Donbas region and Crimea always sought 
guidance from Moscow.61 Thus, centralizing Ukrainian government under Kiev was not 
something that was taken well throughout the entire country. While Ukraine can unite under civic 
and political homogeneity, its late-developing central government does not seem to be able to sway 
those who ethnically and culturally feel more connected to Russia. Furthermore, Ukraine saw a 
power-struggle between Kiev and Crimea, which worsened ethnic and economic tensions instead 
of strengthening political and national identities. Because of this struggle, the ratification and 
adoption of a Ukrainian constitution did not happen until 1996.62 As a result, while Russia’s 
political structures stabilized almost immediately, Ukraine had nothing in place to develop. 
Regions took advantage of this lack of central power, instead choosing to strengthen regional 
governmental structures. Regionalism became such a factor in Ukraine that by the time a 
constitution had been established, and an official government did sit in Kiev, the damage had 
already been done.  
     The political system of Ukraine differs significantly from Russia in that it is not a federation. 
The goal of Kiev after the fall of the Soviet Union was to move towards “Ukrainianization”, not 
to give power to regions that favored relationships with Russia.63 Today, Ukraine now functions 
as a unitary republic under a semi-presidential system. While many of the regional and local 
governments are allotted generous autonomy in determining local policy issues, they do not have 
a substantial platform to voice concerns on the national level, nor do they have representation. 
Ukraine is divided into 27 regions: 24 administrative divisions known as Oblasts, two cities with 
special status (Kiev and Sevastopol), and one autonomous region (Crimea). However, following 
the annexation the Crimean annexation of 2014, Russia officially recognized Crimea and 
Sevastopol as part of the Russian Federation with similar special statuses.  
     The Cabinet of Ministers appoints a head of each government to represent state interests in each 
of these subdivisions. In this way, Ukraine micro-manages how each of the Oblasts is run, and 
essentially attempts to bypass the regional second tier of government. Because of this, it seems 
that it favors a top-down approach, with limited self-rule.64 Furthermore, the Ukrainian system’s 
mix of centrally appointed and locally elected officials causes an overlap of competencies, which 
is neither efficient nor practical. This means that while officials that are elected to represent 
territorial interests are constantly put into conflict with officials that are supposed to realize the 
state’s interest within the regions and vice versa.65 While Crimea is granted exceptional powers as 
an autonomous republic, it still has a history of being checked against the Ukrainian Constitution, 
which repeatedly stipulates that it is subordinate in all ways to Kiev.  
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Explanations for Crimean Secession 
 
Crimean secession did not occur because of one factor; rather, it was a build-up of a events that 
occurred over the course of hundreds of years of history. The passing of the Crimea between 
Russian and Ukrainian hands created deep-rooted, divisive viewpoints over whether the republic 
was subordinate to Russia or Ukraine, or whether it should, in fact, be allowed to act independently 
and of its own accord. Therefore, one of the leading explanations for Crimean secession is identity 
politics. 
     Many people in Crimea want independence, or view Russia as more of a patron state than 
Ukraine. This can be seen in Ukraine’s election results in 2001. During this election, Crimea voted 
overwhelmingly for Yanukovych, the pro-Russian candidate. Within Crimea itself, more than 50% 
of its inhabitants prefer speaking Russia to speaking Ukrainian.66 All of this contributes to 
Crimea’s desire to secede. This hold true even after annexation, as results from a German poll 
(GfK), conducted in 2015, show that 82% of respondents responded that “yes, definitely” they 
supported Russia’s annexation of Crimea, while a further 11% answered “yes, for the most part”.67 
Furthermore, in retrospect, Crimea was more stable under Russian or Soviet rule, in comparison 
to Ukrainian rule. The story of Crimea and Ukraine is one in which  Ukraine is constantly trying 
to smother Crimean independence or reject bids for autonomy, while also trying to bolster their 
own government. On the other hand, Russia has always boasted a strong and stable governmental 
system - one in which Crimea has a place, and negotiation is taken off the table. While this may 
seem like the more repressive of the two options, it is also the more stable of the two. In addition, 
ethnic Russians in Crimea are more numerous than ethnic Ukrainians. In this respect, identity 
politics in Crimea favor Russia over the Ukraine.  
     Regional governance of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea may also be a factor in why 
Crimea chose to secede; however, because of the outcome of actual governance versus theoretical, 
this is not the best solution. The Russian Constitution allows for an ample amount of regional 
authority, with regions or sub”ekty (including Crimea and Sevastopol) being represented across 
the Federal Council - a body which is comprised of those who represent regional interests. On the 
other hand, Ukrainian governmental structure recognizes Crimea and Sevastopol as administrative 
regions and sends national representatives to support national interest therein. This inherently 
seems to allow for less self-rule and governance in the regions. However, because of President 
Vladimir Putin’s reforms, and pro-centralization policy, this explanation does not carry the same 
weight as it had before, because it is unclear whether the Ukrainian system or Putin’s system 
actually allows for more regional autonomy.  
     Other factors that could explain Crimean secession include traditional socioeconomic and 
political reasons. As Russian, the Ukrainian, and Crimean legislative branches all resemble 
parliaments, party politics most likely plays a role in Crimean secession. Certain parties favor 
independence, pro-Russian, or pro-Ukrainian standpoints for a variety of reasons including 
domestic politics, foreign policy, or economic reasons.  
     A final explanation for Crimean secession could be the imminence of a second Cold War or, 
perhaps, a World War III. While these ideas are rather extreme, the escalation of tensions between 
Russia and the European Union along with the United States is a notable event. Currently, the 
 
66 “Crisis in Ukraine: What Happened and Why.” Research Guides, 3 Apr. 2018, 
libguides.gwu.edu/CrisisinUkraine. 
67 Rapoza, Kenneth. “One Year After Russia Annexed Crimea, Locals Prefer Moscow To Kiev.” Forbes, Forbes 
Magazine, 23 Mar. 2015,  
Von Tesckow Morley              “Multi-Level Governance in Eastern Europe” 
 29 
Ukraine is the buffer zone between the EU and Russia - it is by no means a stable environment. 
Furthermore, the stationing of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol is a huge military asset for 
whomever control it. With the lease of certain ports in Sevastopol expiring in 2017, Russia may 
have felt a more urgent need to fully control Crimea.    
 
Limitations and Oversights 
 
Due to time constraints and resource availability, this paper focuses primarily on how post-Soviet 
governmental structures impact Crimea, and it is rather surface-level. The history section 
highlights key events in the 1990s, but fails to consider earlier history. Importantly, the history of 
the Tatars plays a much larger role than this paper suggests before the rise and after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. Furthermore, the paper only covers surface level analysis of what the historical 
events of the 1990s meant for each of the three governments. The full story of the the conflict 
between Russia and the Ukraine over Crimea is much more nuanced. 
     In relation to the governmental structures in place in Russia and the Ukraine, both descriptions 
are cursory. The federal system of Russia is extremely complicated with many contradictions 
present in the Russian Constitution. For this reason, this paper focuses on the overarching picture: 
that regional self-rule was strong under Yeltsin and weakened under Putin. Similarly, for Ukraine, 
the main takeaway is that the structure differs from the Russian structure, as it is not a federation; 
therefore, Crimea fits into the system differently. In addition, the administrative divisions of Russia 
and Ukraine are further divided, with more levels of governance; however, because Crimea sits in 
the second tier in both systems, this paper does not take into account further divisions. With more 
time, RAI coding of the Ukrainian government could have been done to further highlight the 
difference between the Russian system; however, I did not use Russia’s RAI scores because there 
was not anything to juxtapose them with.68
     One last oversight of this paper is that because of the emphasis on regional governance, it 
focuses less on other chief reasons for Crimean secession. Notably, economic concerns are huge 
for all three governments involved, and most likely had one of the largest roles in determining 




In conclusion, Crimea’s history of contact with Russia and Ukraine is nuanced, convoluted, and 
complicated; however, one can easily see how the conflict exacerbates identity politics and crises 
within the region. The ethnic Tatars and Russian minorities have such a strong influence within 
the region that it seemed inevitable that Crimea would not be able to remain under control of 
Ukraine. Furthermore, the history of the Black Sea Fleet and its symbolic connections to Russia 
and the USSR show that Russia would never be content with Ukraine having control over 
Sevastopol. In regards to multilevel governance and Crimea’s role within respected governments, 
it does appear that Crimea gets more recognition and self-rule in the Russian Federation than it 
does in the Ukrainian People’s Republic. While the administrative divisions in Russia and Ukraine 
are structurally similar, the actual governmental structure at the highest level is different and 
provides for less regional representation. However, because of recent moves by Putin, the power 
of regional governments is actually much reduced from those powers originally stated in the 
 
68 Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. Community, Scale, and Regional Governance: a Postfunctionalist Theory of 
Governance. Oxford University Press, 2016. 
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Constitution. Finally, it should be noted that the Russian annexation of Crimea was not violent, 
although military personnel was involved. Crimea had declared independence from Ukraine before 
Russia stepped in (even though it was not recognized constitutionally); therefore, the Crimea story 
will continue to be one of cautionary politics as its annexation is not a black-and-white event.  
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Late one Winter night, a Parisian drives along the Avenue de L’Observatoire. They are forced to 
continue down the avenue slowly because even their headlights are not powerful enough to reveal 
a clear path through the fog. Neither the street lamps or the trees can pierce this fog as it adds a 
film to every rough edge it touches, dulling each and every end point of objects within its reach. 
In Brassaï’s 1934 gelatin silver print entitled Avenue De L’Observatoire, Brassaï captures this 
moment in time. By utilizing the infamous Parisian fog, Brassaï created a work of art that both 
plays with the viewer’s eye and emphasizes the idealization of lines, segmentation, and 
organization put in place by Georges-Eugène Haussmann during an era of destruction and 
modernization. Brassaï reveals the relationship between the green space’s sturdy Haussmannian 
elements and the fog, all the while encouraging the viewer to question traditional assumptions 
about Paris. 
 
When first glancing at Brassaï’s photograph, the viewer’s eye is automatically drawn to the car’s 
headlights shining through the fog. This horizontal line creates a separation between the top half 
of the photograph, the green space, and the bottom half, the street; naturally, the eye wants to focus 
on the illuminated trees on the top half of the photograph rather than the dark street below. The 
straight line of the beam of light then persuades the eye to move from right to left and pause briefly 
in each of three segments of the photograph: the statue, the kiosk, and the bench. Each segment is 
divided by lines of trees and illuminated by further lines of street lamps; by choosing to photograph 
these lines at a diagonal angle, Brassaï is able to show the division of 
the space, while emphasizing the continuation of the numerous types of lines in many directions. 
In total, there are seven variations of lines in the photograph including the car headlights’ beam of 
light, the tree trunks, the bare branches of the trees, the park bench’s pieces of plywood, the outline 
of the kiosk, the lamp posts, and the rows of trees and lamp posts that fade into the distance. Each 
element’s line slices the photograph into sections and organizes it in a way that is pleasing to the 
eye. This is especially true with objects like the trees that reach the edges of the photograph. 
Viewers can even imagine the bench and kiosk’s lines extending outwards because of how dark 
and solid their outlines appear in comparison to the grey fog. While in person, the scene would be 
divided only by the solid elements such as the trees and the street lamps, photography was able to 
capture the element that makes this photograph so unique: fleeting light. 
 
The foggy lighting of the photograph adds a softness to Brassaï’s work that even the harsh lines of 
the tree branches are unable to escape. The Paris fog is draped over each element, and rather than 
focusing his camera for a precise photograph, Brassaï chooses to emphasize the blurry effect of 
the weather and take advantage of its rare visual outcomes. Rather than a beam of light hitting one 
precise point in the photograph, each beam is able to spread outwards by bouncing off of the water 
particles in the air. The stretching light also fills the normally empty, dark spaces of the green 
space with a film of faint greys. As the light reaches into the empty spaces of the photograph, it 
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encourages the viewer’s eye to follow the lines of trees and lamp posts into the background, 
increasing the depth of the photograph; just as the fog has no boundaries or end destination, neither 
do the lines of trees or lamp posts as they appear to go on forever into the distance. Similar to the 
sharp tree branches being smoothed over in the dim mist, these continuous lines of posts and trunks 
are no longer visually precise as well. To achieve this fading effect in photography, the 
photographer must focus on a single point in the foreground. 
As the focus sharpens, the elements in the background begin to appear fuzzy. Brassaï did not need 
to focus his camera on a point in the foreground to achieve this effect because he simply relied on 
the visual effect of the fog that naturally caused the foreground to appear sharper than the 
background. Furthermore, thanks to continuous improvements to shutter speeds on cameras, 
Brassaï had the opportunity to take this photograph at night and capture the prominent comparison 
between dark and light. In this photograph, however, the two extremes appear to blend together 
into a mist of grey, rather than simply black and white. Two areas in the photograph where absolute 
light and dark persist against the fog are the pitch-black road and the bright white headlights and 
lamp post lights; from these starting point extremes, the photograph then begins to fade into a 
foggy grey. 
 
Through his photograph, Brassaï depicts Paris as an overcast city in Winter that lacks a night life. 
Known for being a foggy city, it comes as no surprise that Brassaï was able to capture Paris in such 
a mysterious, calm atmosphere. This constant fog affects the viewer’s experience with the 
photograph because it alters the mood of the scene, however. Rather than a lively, beautiful city to 
be explored as depicted in many paintings by artists such as Monet and Renoir, Paris appears to 
be sullen and quiet. Without any repeatedly depicted elements of Paris such as the Moulin Rouge 
windmill or the Eiffel Tower, it would be difficult for a viewer lacking geographical knowledge 
of Paris to identify the location shown in the photograph. The only element that Brassaï leaves for 
potential identification of the location is the Michel Ney monument on the right, located in the 6th 
arrondissement of Paris; even this is so shrouded in fog that it is practically impossible to identify. 
This communicates to the viewer that Brassaï did not in fact want to emphasize the precise location 
in Paris, but rather the type of location: the green 
space. Our focus is drawn to the organization of this space through straight, clean lines, rather than 
the scenery itself. 
 
When the urban planner Georges-Eugène Haussmann was hired by Emperor Napoleon III, one of 
his primary interests was the creation of parks and green spaces throughout Paris. 
During the early to mid 19th century, Paris was “perceived as a dangerous, unhealthy, and 
frustratingly difficult place to inhabit”69. In Haussmann’s opinion, wide roads such as the Avenue 
De L’Observatoire would bring fresh air into the city, and the green spaces would act as “lungs”, 
ventilating the clean air for the Paris population70. While the green space pictured in Brassaï’s 
photograph is not one of Haussmann’s larger developments such as the Luxembourg gardens or 
the Parc Monceau,71 small green spaces like this one act as important clean-air connections for 
pedestrians between streets and buildings. Without hesitation, Haussmann re- created all of Paris 
through his vision of straight lines and clear organization. Even small parts of Paris such as the 
green space pictured did not escape Haussmann’s attention. We see these effects of 
 
69 Colin Jones, Paris: The Biography of a City (New York, NY, Penguin Books, 2006), 304. 
70 Ibid., 309 
71 Ibid., 313 
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Haussmannization in the orderly rows of trees and street lamps that line the green space. Similar 
to the maps of Paris created after Haussmannization, this photograph is segmented into simple 
squares and rectangles; for example, the center square with the kiosk is lined on all three sides by 
the car’s light shining through the fog and the two trees closest to the Avenue de L’Observatoire 
reaching towards the top of the photograph. Even the weather appears to be aiding Haussmann’s 
vision. 
 
When looking at Brassaï’s print and seeing the dense fog that sheathes the physical elements of 
the scene, the viewer’s eye naturally wants to find something concrete to settle on.While the dim 
glow within the fog is mystifying, the pattern of rows and lines that remain visible in the fog are 
what continue to draw the eye back in. If Brassai had altered the angle of his photograph by 
capturing the scene straight on from the front, he would have eliminated the majority of the depth 
of the photograph; from this angle, the emphasis is on the lines of trees and lamp posts that stretch 
into the background. In this fog, every element appears to continue onward forever because the 
fog hides all harsh, clear edges on objects. The tree branches slowly fade at the tips, never revealing 
their exact end point. The beams of light have no limit as they extend onto countless water particles 
and spread into dark areas of the photograph. There is no escaping this dissolving effect. Even 
Haussmann’s stiff organization is softened by the fog because the viewer is no longer able to 
clearly see the straight lines of trees and lamp posts; rather, we assume they continue into the 
background because the fog stretches the light of the lamp posts into the distance as well, creating 
more depth. 
 
The fog also forces the viewer to make assumptions about the location within the photograph. 
Contrary to popular belief associated with countless impressionistic paintings, Paris is not always 
a lovely place filled to the brim with families and couples out for a stroll. Many onlookers would 
assume that this photograph is not in fact showing Paris because of the gloom and emptiness that 
it depicts. The only elements that viewers are able to use for identification are the weather, the 
well-organized green space, and the blurry Michel Fey monument. Brassaï did not want the 
associated stereotypes of bright colors and crowds that come with recognizing Paris to keep the 
viewer from noticing the most important elements of the photograph: the fog’s effect on 
emphasizing continuous lines, segmentation, and organization within the scene. In many ways, the 
fog helps each line stretch on forever, as they slowly fade into a dim grey. 
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Surrounded by the Tuileries gardens, the Champs Élysées, and the Seine River, the Place de la 
Concorde has maintained its status as one of Paris’s major public squares since its construction in 
the late eighteenth century. It is marked by a tumultuous history, first serving as a monument to 
the then ruling Louis XV and subsequently transforming into a site of mass guillotine executions 
during the French Revolution.72 As a public space, the Place de la Concorde has witnessed 
dynamic shifts in Parisian society throughout the past two centuries and has been the subject of 
numerous artists. French painter Jean Béraud, renowned for depicting the life of Paris during the 
Belle Époque, portrays a woman in the square at the end of the nineteenth century in his 1885 work 
titled Parisian on the Place de la Concorde (Figure 1). Seven decades later, Russian-French artist 
and early modernist Marc Chagall portrayed a man, woman, and child overlooking the square in 
his vibrant color lithograph Place de la Concorde (Figure 2). Béraud’s painting, oscillating 
between impressionist and Salon-style techniques, offers a glimpse of the emerging dominance 
Parisian women began to enjoy in public spaces during the Belle Époque. Chagall’s lithograph, 
distinct in its vivid coloring and expressive sketching, presents individuals living in a post-war 
Paris, categorized by reconstruction and an influx of migrants.73 Thus, Béraud’s and Chagall’s 
diverse depictions of the Place de la Concorde and its frequenters implicate the viewer in Paris’s 
evolution as a city that underwent “an unparalleled period of contentment and pleasures” during 
the 1880s, followed by a post-war period of modernization seventy years later.74 
 Béraud’s portrait of an elegantly dressed woman holding a daintily wrapped package in the 
Place de la Concorde is characteristic of the “detailed, legible, and apparently objective images” 
of Paris life that distinguished his career as a Salon artist.75 Although he was the friend of 
aristocrats and espoused right-wing politics, Béraud’s quasi-encyclopedic apparent objectivity 
established his works as social analyses of the Belle Époque. In Parisian on the Place de la 
Concorde, Béraud denotes the upper-class status of the woman by emphasizing the fluid and 
tailored shapes of her dress whilst creating a visual juxtaposition of her dark figure with the “grey 
and ochre backdrop” of the square.76 Béraud accentuates the woman’s flamboyant attire and allows 
her figure to take up the majority of the portraits space. The neatly wrapped package the woman 
carefully holds, placed at the center of the painting to contrast the dark dress, is suggestive of her 
materialistic tendencies and ability to partake in activities of leisure such as shopping. Thus, 
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Béraud highlights the woman’s privilege to enjoy luxury and benefit from the economic prosperity 
of the period. The presence of male figures in the background dressed in coats and top hats evinces 
the peace of the Belle Époque by revealing to the viewer that the men of Paris are at home living 
and working, rather than away at war. Béraud’s inclusion of the shape of a faint horse-drawn 
carriage on the horizon reinforces the late nineteenth century quality of the work, as automobiles 
did not become widely available until the early twentieth century. The aforementioned details 
serve as visual affirmations of a time period in which Paris was experiencing peace and intervals 
of economic success from the beginning of the French Third Republic to the outbreak of World 
War I, otherwise known as the Belle Époque.  
 Along with prominent artists of the late nineteenth century such as Degas, Toulouse-
Lautrec, and Picasso, Béraud embarked on a “quest for the representation of the living woman” in 
his art.77 The direct gaze of the woman in Béraud’s work, coupled with the absence of a male 
figure by her side, emphasizes her independence as well as the increased social freedom women 
had begun to enjoy in Paris toward the latter half of the nineteenth century. As the twentieth century 
dawned, French society recognized ordinary activities such as shopping alone to be “symbolically 
revolutionary acts” carried out by distinctly modern women.78 Parisian women gradually began to 
reject their confinement to compressed interior spaces and emerged in the public sphere where 
they dominated squares, parks, and gardens without being categorized as sexualized or fallen.79 
The boulevard culture of promenading in public spaces enabled artists to portray women as 
“independent, active creators and consumers of modern culture” alongside their male 
counterparts.80 Thus, Béraud’s depiction of a woman enjoying independence and luxury serves as 
an integral element of the lingering Haussmannian vision for Paris to be the quintessential 
definition of modernity.  
 Chagall’s Place de la Concorde advances and reshapes the concept of Parisian modernity 
through his allusion to immigration and urban renewal following the end of World War II. 
Throughout the 1950s, France experienced an influx of European immigrants searching for better 
opportunities that their war-ravished native countries could not offer them.81 Jews, Armenians, 
Poles, and Russians were the primary immigrant groups that looked to France as a “refuge from 
the turmoil and persecution” that persisted in their homelands.82 As a Belarusian Jew living in 
France at the time, Chagall incorporated both Eastern and Western lines of art tradition to 
symbolize the increasing diversification of post-war Paris, as well as his own liminality between 
France and Russia.83 The concentric and circular form of Eastern art manifests in the figures of the 
woman and child that are being covered with a round protective veil by a male figure in the sky. 
In contrast, the linear form of Western art is depicted in the straight strokes Chagall uses to 
illustrate the Luxor Obelisk in the center of the Place de la Concorde and its surrounding buildings. 
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The visual collision of East and West adheres to the immigration patterns observed in France, and 
reinforces the lithograph’s narrative of a French fatherland providing protection to Eastern 
European immigrants seeking refuge.  
 The levitation of the figures and their overarching dominance of the landscape below, a 
common theme in Chagall’s works, symbolizes the cultural transcendence of the immigrant 
psyche.84 A faint green halo surrounds the heads of the woman and child, alluding to the 
iconographic images of Madonna and Child present in Slavic Orthodox churches. By painting the 
woman in the image of Madonna, Chagall accentuates the sacrificial role Eastern European women 
played in the war when summoned by their homelands to send their sons to the frontlines. Thus, 
the religious connotation of the woman portrays her as a votive figure seeking sanctuary in Paris, 
a city of cultural diversification. Chagall’s choice to incorporate vehicles at the bottom of the 
lithograph highlights Paris’s technological rebirth after the war, as the availability of resources 
grew due to the region’s newfound peace. Through his emphasis of immigration and technological 
advancement, Chagall’s work offers the viewer an image of a growing and recovering Paris. 
Whereas Béraud’s concept of Parisian modernity was defined by wealth and the autonomy of 
women, Chagall’s notion of modernity was grounded in Paris’s post-war revival and its acceptance 
of immigrants in pursuit of better lives.  
 Béraud’s work provides the viewer a conceptualization of late nineteenth century Paris 
through the image of an upper-class Parisian woman enjoying her newfound independence from 
the confined sphere of private life. The limited background presence of the male figure in the 
painting expands upon the idea that Parisian women began to exist for themselves rather than as 
an extension of men. Béraud presents the woman as an iconographic representation of the Belle 
Époque, in which Paris enjoyed a period of peace and prosperity prior to the beginning of World 
War I. Chagall’s work conceptualizes post-war 1950s Paris as a city that provides protection for 
Eastern European immigrants fleeing their destroyed homelands. While Béraud emphasizes the 
materialistic and independent qualities of the woman in Parisian on the Place de la Concorde, 
Chagall highlights the sacrificial quality of immigrant women and the way in which they existed 
between two cultures in his Place de la Concorde. Both artists depict modes of transportation 
representative of their works’ respective time periods. Béraud paints a horse drawn carriage that 
was used prior to the invention of the automobile whilst Chagall illustrates vehicles on a road to 
mark the technological advancement Paris experienced after World War II.  
 Béraud’s and Chagall’s portrayals of the Place de la Concorde offer two characterizations 
of Paris’s modernity seven decades apart. The works suggest a shift in the public sphere, as well 
as in Parisian innovation. Thus, the artists’ depictions of women and the small background details 
in each work illuminate life in Paris as a constantly evolving pursuit of modernity. 
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Figure 1:  Jean Béraud, Parisian on the Place de la Concorde, 1885, oil on panel, 47.7x39.8 cm, Paris, Musée Carnavalet 
 
 
Figure 2: Marc Chagall, Place de la Concorde, 1952, color lithograph, 35.2x26.4 cm, Washington, DC, National Gallery of Art 




Blévis, Laure, and Eric Pezet. “CFTC/CFDT Attitudes towards Immigration in the Parisian
 Region: Making Immigrant Workers’ Condition a Cause.” Urban Studies 49, no. 3
 (February 2012): 685–701. doi:10.1177/0042098011431619. 
"Concorde, Place de la." In The Columbia Encyclopedia, by Paul Lagasse, and Columbia
 University. 8th ed. Columbia University Press, 2018.
 http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=https://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/colu
 mency/concorde_place_de_la/0?institutionId=1724 
Cooke, Victoria. "Femme, Femme, Femme: Paintings of Women in French Society from Daumier
 to Picasso from the Museums of France." American Artist 71, no. 776 (May 2007):1-70.
 http://libproxy.lib.unc.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
 com.libproxy.lib.unc.edu/docview/232316825?accountid=14244. 
D’Souza, Aruna, and Tom McDonough. The Invisible Flâneuse? Gender, Public Space, and
 Visual Culture in Nineteenth-Century Paris. New York: Manchester University Press,
 2006. 
Jones, Colin. Paris: The Biography of a City. London: Penguin Books, 2006. 
Kaplan, David H. “Immigration and the making of place in Paris.” Journal of Cultural Geography
 32, no.1 (2015): 23-39. https://doi.org/10.1080/08873631.2015.1004855 
Lvovich, Natasha. “Translingual Identity and Art: Marc Chagall’s Stride through the Gates of
 Janus.” Critical Multilingualism Studies 3, no.1 (2015): 112-134. ISSN 2325-2871. 
Thomson, Richard. "Jean Béraud. Paris." The Burlington Magazine 141, no. 1160 (1999): 699-
 700. http://www.jstor.org/stable/888579. 
Weisstein, Allyn. "Iconography of Chagall." The Kenyon Review 16, no. 1 (1954): 38-48, JSTOR,
 http://www.jstor.org/stable/4333462. 
 
 
